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“Men do not desire merely to be rich, but to be richer than other men.”
John Stuart Mill
1 Introduction
Economists have long believed that relative consumption effects, in which a person’s satisfac-
tion with their own consumption depends on how much others are consuming, are important
(Veblen, 1899). Indeed, the growing literature on happiness in economics points to relative
wealth concerns as one of the main explanations for why the growth in GDP over the last
fifty years has not been accompanied by a similar increase in life satisfaction.1 Starting with
Abel (1990) and Gaĺı (1994), such relative wealth concerns have been formally modeled in
the asset pricing literature. To date, the theoretical literature has primarily focused on the
price implications that these consumption externalities have in a symmetric information en-
vironment. In this paper, we identify an additional channel through which relative wealth
concerns affect asset prices. By incorporating relative wealth concerns into a rational expec-
tations equilibrium (REE) model, we examine how such consumption externalities influence
the production of information in the economy.
The economic setting we use extends the model developed by Hellwig (1980) and Verrec-
chia (1982) to account for “keeping up with the Joneses” (KUJ) preferences. In particular,
we adopt a preference specification similar to Gaĺı (1994), in which an investor’s marginal
utility of consumption increases in the average consumption of the other investors in the
economy. This allows for the idea that investors care not only about their own wealth, but
also about how their wealth compares with that of others, in the spirit of John Stuart Mill’s
quote. In all other respects, our model is standard: agents decide whether or not to acquire
costly information about asset payoffs before trading, and, based on that information, trade
a risky and a riskless asset in a competitive market.
1For two recent surveys of the topic, see Frey and Stutzer (2002) and Clark, Frijters, and Shields (2008).
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Our main result is to show that consumption externalities resulting from a KUJ prefer-
ence specification can generate complementarities in information acquisition. In the standard
model, an investor’s expected benefit from collecting information is decreasing in the number
of informed agents. The reason is that as more agents acquire and act on their informa-
tion, prices become more informative and uninformed agents can free-ride on the learning of
others. If agents are sensitive to the wealth of others, this information revelation effect is
counteracted by the investors’ desire to keep up with their peers. A larger number of informed
agents increases the expected trading profit of the average agent and, hence, reduces an un-
informed agent’s relative position in the economy. The disutility associated with a higher
average wealth level therefore raises the value of information. We find that if the number of
informed investors is not too high, relative wealth concerns dominate the information reve-
lation effect, and the marginal value of information increases in the number of agents who
acquire it. This creates incentives for agents to strategically coordinate their information
production activities. Such coordination entails forming beliefs about the actions of other
agents. These beliefs may be self-fulfilling, introducing the possibility of multiple “herding”
equilibria with the property that some assets receive considerable attention while others with
similar characteristics are ignored.
These complementarities in information acquisition have a number of important impli-
cations. First, they lead to an increase in informed trading, which reduces the risk that
investors have to bear and, hence, lowers the equilibrium risk premium. Allowing investors
to endogenously choose their information structure reinforces the effect of relative wealth
concerns on the equity premium that has been identified in previous studies: in addition
to the direct effect due to negative consumption externalities, as agents are more willing to
hold risky assets if their peers hold them too, KUJ preferences have an indirect effect due
to the increased value of private information to investors, which further reduces the equity
premium.
Another important implication relates to price discontinuities. Extending our model to
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a dynamic setting in which the distribution of asset payoffs is linked to past realizations, we
show that an infinitesimal shift in fundamentals can lead to a discrete jump in asset prices.
The mechanism responsible for these price jumps is complementarities in the demand for
information that, together with small changes in fundamental risk, make investors switch
between no-information and high-information equilibria. The same forces that generate price
jumps can also cause excess volatility. Price jumps can be viewed as an extreme form of excess
volatility in the sense that these are price movements that are unrelated to fundamentals.
The existence of complementarities in the information market can lead to a particularly
strong form of herding. By giving agents a choice between perfectly correlated signals and
signals that are independently distributed conditional on the asset’s payoff, we demonstrate
that if relative wealth considerations are sufficiently strong, agents prefer the former signals.
This inefficient allocation of research effort can arise because the gain from trading on new
information may be more than offset by the disutility that an agent incurs when her con-
sumption falls short of the average level.2 This result is in stark contrast to the standard REE
model (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Hellwig, 1980), in which agents always prefer to acquire
conditionally independent signals. As prices partially reveal the agents’ private information,
traders are better off with information that is orthogonal to prices.
Most of our analysis is conducted under the assumption that relative wealth concerns
are global, in the sense that agents care about their relative position with respect to the
entire economy. However, the empirical literature on investors’ portfolio choice (discussed
below) has also documented some anomalies that are local in nature. In order to address
these issues, we extend our model by grouping agents into different communities and by
introducing relative wealth considerations within each community. Interestingly, we find
that, in many cases, symmetric equilibria in which different communities of agents follow the
2We want to emphasize that the information inefficiencies that we discuss in this paper pertain to the
agents’ information acquisition decisions: relative wealth concerns induce agents to focus on the same source
of information, rather than on a diverse set of signals. However, the market is efficient at the pricing stage.
Once a set of information has been acquired, market prices incorporate this information in a Bayesian fashion.
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same information acquisition strategy are unstable. There exist, however, stable equilibria
with the property that each community of agents specializes on gathering information about
particular assets. Thus, consistent with the growing literature studying community effects
and social interactions, we show that agents overinvest in some assets (and neglect others),
relative to the predictions of modern portfolio theory.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review
of the relevant literature. Section 3 discusses the preferences we use to model consumption
externalities and formally defines an equilibrium. Section 4 describes the equilibrium at the
trading stage and the information acquisition stage. Section 5 shows how complementarities
in information acquisition can generate jumps in asset prices. Section 6 demonstrates that
consumption externalities resulting from a KUJ preference specification can lead to an ineffi-
cient allocation of the agent’s research effort. Section 7 introduces the notion of communities
and studies the implications of local relative wealth concerns. Section 8 summarizes our
contribution and concludes. All proofs are contained in the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
Our paper is related to several strands of the literature. First, it is related to the literature
that studies relative wealth concerns. This literature examines if and to what extent people’s
happiness depends on the consumption of others. Frey and Stutzer (2002) and Clark, Frijters,
and Shields (2008) provide an excellent review of the empirical evidence on the relationship
between relative position and well-being. In the finance literature, Abel (1990) was the
first to introduce relative considerations with his “catching up with the Joneses” preference
specification. Abel (1990) and Gaĺı (1994) consider these consumption externalities as a
potential resolution to the equity premium puzzle. Bakshi and Chen (1996) study their
impact on stock price volatility; Gómez, Priestley, and Zapatero (2006, 2008) study the
cross-sectional implications of relative wealth concerns. More recently, DeMarzo, Kaniel, and
4
Kremer (2004) present a model in which relative wealth considerations arise endogenously.
They demonstrate that when investors care about their consumption relative to their local
community, there may be a community effect whereby investors under-diversify and over-
invest in local firms. We differ from this literature in that we examine the consequences that
relative wealth concerns have on information acquisition. Rather than exogenously imposing
an allocation of information, we endogenously derive the investors’ incentives to engage in
information collection activities. In contrast to symmetric information models, our model
also predicts that local investors will outperform non-local investors, which is consistent with
the empirical literature.3
Our paper also contributes to the literature on the home bias puzzle and on other local
or community biases in portfolio choice.4 Our model uses similar preferences to those en-
dogenously derived in DeMarzo, Kaniel, and Kremer (2004) to explain the concentration of
holdings. However, the actual mechanism is rather different and works via complementarities
in the acquisition of information: agents have similar portfolios because they mimic each
other’s efforts to learn about securities. Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2008) also present
a model in which informational asymmetries are used to explain the home equity bias. In
contrast to their paper, in which information is a strategic substitute, agents in our model
may buy information that others already have, even when other information is available to
them, since this ensures that their wealth will be highly correlated with that of their peers.
A number of papers have studied complementarities in information acquisition. Froot,
Scharfstein, and Stein (1992) show that if agents have short horizons, the value of an infor-
mative signal about asset payoffs can increase in the number of agents owning the signal.
This occurs because short-term speculators who have to liquidate their position before any
public news arrives can only profit from their information if it is subsequently reflected in
3See, for example, Coval and Moskowitz (2001) and Ivković and Weisbenner (2005b).
4For empirical evidence on this topic, see French and Poterba (1991), Coval and Moskowitz (2001), Grinblatt
and Keloharju (2001), Duflo and Saez (2002), Feng and Seasholes (2004), Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004a,b),
Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2005), Ivković and Weisbenner (2005b, 2007), Brown, Ivković, Weisbenner, and Smith
(2008), and Dorn, Huberman, and Sengmueller (2008).
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the price through the trades of similarly informed investors. Veldkamp (2006a,b) generates
complementarities by incorporating information markets in which agents can acquire informa-
tive signals at endogenously determined prices into the REE model developed by Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980). This paper expands on this literature by showing that complementari-
ties in information acquisition can arise rather naturally as a consequence of relative wealth
considerations.5
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on bubbles and crashes in financial markets
(see Brunnermeier, 2001, for an excellent survey of this literature). Whereas early papers
by Gennotte and Leland (1990) and Jacklin, Kleidon, and Pfleiderer (1992) focus on the
role of portfolio insurance, our paper is more closely related to the literature that links
the existence of crashes to informational considerations (Barlevy and Veronesi, 2003; Bai,
Chang, and Wang, 2006; Mele and Sangiorgi, 2008). In a dynamic setting with symmetric
information, DeMarzo, Kaniel, and Kremer (2008) show that endogenous relative wealth
concerns can create bubble-like deviations in asset prices. Our paper complements theirs
by providing an alternative mechanism that generates crashes via endogenous information
acquisition decisions.
3 The Model
This section introduces a model which extends the rational expectations model developed
by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Hellwig (1980), and Verrecchia (1982) to allow for con-
sumption externalities. In particular, we assume that agents care not only about their own
consumption, but also about that of their peers.
5Within the REE paradigm, Barlevy and Veronesi (2000, 2008), Chamley (2008), Ganguli and Yang (2007)
and Mele and Sangiorgi (2008) provide other mechanisms that make information a complementary good. See
Hellwig and Veldkamp (2008) and Goldstein, Ozdenoren, and Yuan (2008) for an analysis of complementarities
in information acquisition in global games.
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3.1 Preferences and assets
We study a three-period economy with consumption taking place only in the last period (i.e.,
at t = 3). At t = 2, there is a round of trade, whereas at t = 1, agents make a decision
as to whether to become informed or not. These two stages are described in more detail
below. Since consumption takes place only at the final date, we shall use the terms wealth
and consumption interchangeably.




, where Wi denotes her
terminal wealth, and W̄ denotes the average wealth in the economy. Specifically, we assume
that the agents’ utility function is given by:
u(Wi, W̄ ) = − exp(−τ(Wi − γW̄ )). (1)
The particular functional form we have chosen captures the notion that agents care about
the consumption of others in the most parsimonious way. We note that the utility function
satisfies the usual conditions with respect to an agents own consumption Wi: it is increasing
and concave in Wi, and the coefficient of absolute risk-aversion is −u11/u1 = τ . The param-
eter γ captures the extent of the consumption externality, i.e., how much agent i cares about
other agents’ wealth. The utility specification in (1) satisfies u12/u1 = γτ , which implies that
an increase in the average wealth in the economy raises the marginal utility of consumption
when γ is positive, as an agent tries to “keep up with the Joneses.”
The preferences we introduce are essentially the CARA version of the standard KUJ
preferences with CRRA utility.6 A crucial feature of the specification in (1) is that agent
i receives a negative utility shock when average wealth W̄ is high and γ > 0. In order to
mitigate such a shock, she will trade in the same direction as the average agent, in order
6The properties of the utility function in (1) are identical to those discussed on page 3 of Gaĺı (1994), with
the exception that there is no scaling by consumption. The additive structure we use in (1), as opposed to the
multiplicative structure used in most of the asset pricing literature in conjunction with CRRA preferences, is
more natural when coupled with CARA preferences, which are standard in the REE literature (Ljungqvist
and Uhlig (2000) use a similar formulation).
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to induce a high correlation between her wealth and that of others. This is the source of
complementarities in the agents’ decisions that will drive our results.
We want to emphasize that our contribution is to study the effect of consumption external-
ities in information acquisition activities in financial markets. The particular interpretation
of the utility function introduced above is not critical. For example, one could interpret γ as
measuring jealousy (our preferences satisfy both the definition of jealousy and that of KUJ
introduced in Dupor and Liu, 2003). Further, although we focus on the case where γ is posi-
tive, the model formally also allows for the case where agents view the consumption of others
as a substitute for their own consumption. Finally, we should remark that the consumption
externalities we consider are global instead of local, in the sense that agent i cares about the
average consumption, not the consumption of their neighbors (see, for example, Glaeser and
Scheinkman, 2002, and Bisin, Horst, and Özgüra, 2006, for other utility specifications). We
also want to point out that the type of preferences we study can be constructed from a purely
axiomatic approach (Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini, 2008).
Rather than stemming form investors’ preferences, relative wealth concerns in financial
markets can also be motivated by the current compensation contracts in the mutual fund
industry. Indeed, most fund managers get compensated not just based on total performance,
but rather on their performance relative to a peer group (i.e., growth funds, small-cap funds,
. . . ). If we interpret W̄ in (1) as the value of the reference portfolio, letting γ = 1 corresponds
to a setting where agents maximize the portfolio returns relative to this reference portfolio.
Further, given that professional fund managers are the most likely investors to possess private
information, and to exert effort to acquire such private signals, KUJ preferences may actually
be even more relevant for them than the standard ones.
We study a competitive market that is populated by a continuum of agents, represented
by the set [0, 1]. There are two assets available for trading in the market: a riskless asset
in perfectly elastic supply with a price and payoff normalized to 1, and a risky asset with a
random final payoff of X ∈ R. We assume that all random variables belong to a linear space
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of jointly normally distributed random variables. In particular, we assume that the risky
asset pays off X ∼ N (µx, σ2x). The aggregate supply of the risky asset is random and equals
Z ∼ N (µz, σ2z). Such supply shocks are a typical ingredient of rational expectations models.
The noise that they create prevents equilibrium prices from fully revealing the informed
agents’ private information.
A fraction λ of the agents receive a private signal prior to trading, whereas the rest are
uninformed and must base their trading decision solely on their priors and what they may
learn from prices. Specifically, we assume that, by incurring a cost of c, agent i can observe the
signal Yi = X+ εi, where εi ∼ N (0, σ2ε ). The error terms {εi} are assumed to be independent
across agents (we relax this assumption in section 6). We use Fi to denote the information
set of agent i at the time of trading.7 Without loss of generality, we can label the informed
agents with the subscripts i ∈ [0, λ]. We also let θi denote the number of shares of the risky
asset bought by agent i, so that, assuming zero initial wealth, we have Wi = θi(X−P ), where
P denotes the price of the risky asset. Finally, average wealth equals W̄ =
∫ 1
0 θi(X − P )di.
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3.2 Definition of equilibrium
Fixing the fraction of informed agents, λ, a rational expectations equilibrium is characterized
by a set of trading strategies {θi}, i ∈ [0, 1], and a price function P , such that:
(1) Each agent i chooses her trading strategy θi so as to maximize her expected utility





− exp(−τ(Wi − γW̄ ))|Fi
]
, i ∈ [0, 1]. (2)
7Note that Fi = σ(Yi, P ) for informed agents i ∈ [0, λ], and Fi = σ(P ) for uninformed agents i ∈ [λ, 1],
where σ(X) denotes the σ-algebra generated by a random variable X, and P is the price of the risky asset.
8We consider the information acquisition cost c a non-pecuniary cost that does not affect the average wealth
W̄ . However, subtracting the aggregate cost λc from W̄ would not change our results, since this reduction in
average wealth is the same for informed and uninformed investors.
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(2) Markets clear, i.e.: ∫ 1
0
θi di = Z. (3)
As is customary in the literature, we restrict our attention to linear equilibria. Thus,
we postulate that the equilibrium price is a linear function of the average signal and the
aggregate stock supply, such that:
P = a+ bX − dZ. (4)
In the ensuing analysis, we derive a linear equilibrium in which this conjecture is confirmed
to be correct.
At the ex-ante stage (i.e., at t = 1), agents must decide whether to spend $c in order to
get a private signal Yi prior to trading. Letting θ̂i denote the optimal trading strategy of
















θ̂i(X − P )− γW̄
))]
. (5)
An equilibrium at the information acquisition stage is defined by a fraction of agents
λ ∈ [0, 1] such that (i) all informed agents i ∈ [0, λ] are better off spending c in order
to obtain information, taking all other agents’ actions as given; (ii) all uninformed agents
j ∈ [λ, 1] are better off staying uninformed than purchasing information, taking all other
agents’ actions as given. To be more precise, let VI(λ) ≡ Ui for any informed agent i ∈ [0, λ],
and let VU (λ) ≡ Uj for any uninformed agent j ∈ [λ, 1]. Then, an interior equilibrium at the
information acquisition stage is a fraction λ ∈ (0, 1) such that VI(λ)− c = VU (λ). The non-
interior equilibria are defined in the natural way: λ = 0 is an equilibrium if VI(0)−c ≤ VU (0),
and λ = 1 is an equilibrium if VI(1)− c ≥ VU (1).
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The model outlined thus far reduces to a symmetric version of Verrecchia (1982) if γ = 0.
Diamond (1985) solves such a model in closed form, showing, among other things, that the
equilibrium at the information acquisition stage is unique, i.e., there is a unique λ ∈ [0, 1]
that satisfies the above definition. The focus of our analysis is to see how consumption
externalities change the equilibrium at the trading stage, as well as the incentives to acquire
information.
4 Characterization of Equilibrium
In this section, we solve for the equilibrium defined above by backward induction. First, we
conjecture that a fraction λ of agents become informed and solve for the equilibrium asset
prices at the trading stage at t = 2. Then, we study the ex-ante information acquisition
decision of agents at t = 1, given that they anticipate the equilibrium in the asset market at
t = 2.
When agents have relative wealth concerns, they must form beliefs about the trading
strategies of all other traders, since their utility is affected directly by the average wealth
of other investors. We start by assuming that a fraction λ of the agents are informed, i.e.,
they receive signals of the form Yi = X + εi. We conjecture that in equilibrium an informed
agent’s trading strategy will be of the affine form θi = α+ βYi − δP , whereas an uninformed
agent’s strategy is given by θi = ζ − νP , for some constants α, β, δ, ζ, ν ∈ R. This implies




θidi = ξ + λβX − κP, (6)
with κ = λδ + (1− λ)ν and ξ = λα+ (1− λ)ζ.9
9Here, we have assumed that
∫ 1
0
εidi = 0. Of course, with a continuum of agents, any appeal to a law of
large numbers will encounter some well-known technical problems. For a discussion of these problems and
solutions to them, see Judd (1985).
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We first note that average wealth W̄ = θ̄(X−P ) is a quadratic function in X, which makes
the investment problem in (2) non-standard: the relevant payoff variable Wi − γW̄ is not
normally distributed, conditional on the information set of either informed or uninformed
agents. This is due to the fact that agents are asymmetrically informed. As they try to
tilt their portfolios closer to their peers, they need to forecast the trades of other agents.
The following proposition shows that the optimal investment problem is nonetheless fairly
tractable and that a rational expectations equilibrium exists under mild conditions.
Proposition 1. Suppose that γ < 1/(τσxσz). Then, for a given fraction of informed agents
λ, an equilibrium exists. The optimal investment by agent i in the risky asset is given by:
θi =




ξ − P (κ− λβ)
)
, (7)
where Fi denotes the information possessed by agent i.
Equilibrium prices are as in (4); the equilibrium price coefficients are given in the Ap-
pendix.
The rational expectations equilibrium presented in Proposition 1 shares many of the prop-
erties of the standard model. As in Hellwig (1980), price aggregates the disperse information
possessed by agents, while the stochastic supply Z prevents prices from fully revealing the
payoff X. The informational content of prices is given by:10










We note that price informativeness is exactly as in Hellwig (1980). The only difference in the
information content of prices between the standard model and the one with KUJ preferences
comes through a different fraction of informed agents, λ, which we endogenize below.
Other equilibrium price properties are directly affected by the preference externality pa-
10See the proof of Proposition 1.
12
rameter γ. For example, the equity premium, defined as E [X − P ], is given by:11
E [X − P ] = τ(1− γ)µz
var(X|P )−1 + λ(1− γ)
σ2ε
. (9)
In the absence of asymmetric information (i.e., when λ = 0), the risk premium on the stock is
given by E [X − P ] = τ(1− γ)µzσ2x. The KUJ parameter γ therefore lowers the equilibrium
risk premium, just as in the standard model with CRRA preferences (Gaĺı, 1994). This result
follows from an increased demand for the risky asset caused by relative wealth concerns: when
γ is positive, the investors’ marginal utility of consumption is higher in “good times” (i.e., for
high realizations of X and, hence, of W̄ ), and lower in “bad times” (i.e., for low realizations
of X). The presence of informed agents leads to a further reduction in the equity premium:
as more information is impounded in prices, agents demand a smaller compensation for the
lower (conditional) risk that they bear.
Proposition 1 shows that an agent’s optimal trading strategy contains the standard mean-
variance term plus a term that depends explicitly on the consumption externality parameter
γ. As expected, traders try to mimic the trading strategy of the average agent: the term
depending on γ in equation (7) mimics the average trade given by equation (6). Thus, Propo-
sition 1 formalizes the intuition that traders tilt their portfolio to imitate the P -measurable
portion of the average portfolio.
The existence condition in the above proposition, γ < 1/(τσxσz), comes from the second-
order condition of the agents’ optimization problem.12 Intuitively, agents’ expected utility
will not be well-defined, if they put too much weight on their peers’ wealth. Although the
condition is simple, it is far from necessary. The necessary and sufficient condition for the
existence of the rational expectations equilibrium is provided in the proof of the proposition
11This expression follows immediately from the equilibrium price coefficients specified by equations (43) and
(44) in the Appendix.
12Gaĺı (1994) also needs to constrain the amount of consumption externalities in order to guarantee existence
of an equilibrium in his model.
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(see equation (45)).
We next endogenize the fraction of traders that become informed. Intuitively, we expect
the incentives to acquire information to differ from the standard model, since agents with
KUJ preferences also care about the information that other agents possess. The following
proposition solves for the equilibria at the ex-ante information acquisition stage in closed
form.
Proposition 2. Let Ĉ = 1/(σ2ε (e
2τc − 1))− 1/σ2x and assume that γ < 1/(τσxσz).
1. If Ĉ > 0, then there exists a unique equilibrium at the information acquisition stage.










2. If Ĉ ≤ 0, then two cases are relevant:
(a) If τ2γ2 + Ĉ/σ2z ≥ 0, then there are three equilibria at the information acquisition










(b) If τ2γ2 + Ĉ/σ2z < 0, the unique equilibrium is for all agents to stay uninformed,
i.e., λ = 0.
Proposition 2 shows that there are three different types of equilibria, depending on the
value of Ĉ.13 When information is very costly, Ĉ is negative and large, and consequently in
the unique equilibrium no agent becomes informed. When the cost of gathering information
is sufficiently low, Ĉ is positive, and the unique equilibrium involves a fraction of agents
13Note that Ĉ is decreasing in the cost of gathering information, c.
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λ∗ > 0 gathering information. These are the only two regimes that arise in the standard
model, i.e., when there are no consumption externalities (γ = 0).
The novel regime occurs when γ is sufficiently large relative to Ĉ, and Ĉ is negative (i.e.,
for intermediate values of the cost parameter c). In this case, there are three equilibria at the
information acquisition stage: one where no agent becomes informed, and two others where
a positive fraction of agents become informed. Intuitively, when agents expect other agents
to purchase information, they have an incentive to purchase information as well, since they
want to keep up with their peers, even if it is expensive to do so. At the same time, if no
one expects others to purchase information, not acquiring information is an optimal strategy.
This multiplicity of equilibria arises naturally from KUJ preferences and drives the core of
the results discussed below.
It is worth noting that λ∗ is increasing in the KUJ parameter γ. Thus, the fraction
of informed investors in the presence of negative consumption externalities exceeds the one
in the standard model.14 This increase in information production has several important
implications. First, it makes prices more informative about the asset’s fundamentals. As
can be seen from equation (8), the residual payoff uncertainty, conditional on the equilibrium
price P , is strictly decreasing in λ. Second, and more importantly, more informed trading
reduces the risk premium that investors require to hold the risky asset in equilibrium (see
equation (9)). Thus, by endogenizing the agents’ information acquisition decision, we identify
a new channel through which relative wealth concerns affect the equity premium. In addition
to the direct channel discussed above, there is an indirect channel that operates through
changes in the value of information to investors.
Figure 1 plots the equilibrium values of λ as a function of the cost of gathering information.
When there are no consumption externalities (γ = 0), the unique equilibrium is represented
by the solid line. In this case, a positive fraction of agents acquire information if and only if
14Note that in the standard model where γ = 0, the unique equilibrium is characterized by λ = 0 whenever
there are multiple equilibria under KUJ preferences.
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the cost c is smaller than 0.55. Once investors care about their peers’ wealth, multiplicity of
equilibria arises. For example, when γ = 0.4, Figure 1 shows that when the cost parameter c
takes on intermediate values, namely when c ∈ (0.55, 0.62), there are three different equilibria,
two of which have a positive fraction of informed agents. When c is lower than 0.55, there
is a unique equilibrium that involves some agents gathering information. For costs higher
than 0.62, the unique equilibrium coincides with the one in the absence of consumption
externalities, since no agent becomes informed.
As the proof of Proposition 2 shows, agent i’s ex-ante certainty equivalent of wealth, gross











where H is independent of the information that the agent possesses. This expression shows
that, in contrast to the standard model, the agents’ utility may be decreasing in the fraction
of informed investors when γ > 0.15 The reason is that under KUJ preferences, informed
agents impose a negative externality on the other agents, because they earn on average higher
profits. Furthermore, this externality generates complementarities in information acquisition
decisions. In order to see this, let R(λ) = VI(λ) − VU (λ) denote the marginal value of
information (gross of the cost of obtaining the information). An interior equilibrium is given
by the condition R(λ) = c. One can easily verify that dR(λ)/dγ ≥ 0, which means that the















The value of information can therefore increase in the number of informed agents, as long as
agents care about each other’s wealth. In the standard case (γ = 0), increasing the number
of informed agents lowers the value of information, because prices become more informative.
15Note, however, that the conditional precision var(X|Fi)−1 is increasing in λ and, hence, in γ.
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When γ is positive, we find that as long as λ is low enough so that the information revelation
effect does not dominate, there are complementarities in information acquisition in the sense
that the marginal value of information is increasing in the number of agents who buy the
information. Intuitively, if a trader’s neighbors buy information, consumption externalities
will increase the incentives of this trader to gather information herself.
As Proposition 2 shows, multiple equilibria at the information acquisition stage exist when
the cost of gathering information is in an intermediate range such that Ĉ ∈ [−τ2γ2σ2z , 0]. In
order to assess the plausibility of the three different equilibria that arise in this case, we
employ a refinement criteria based on dynamic stability. The definition of stability relies on
an iterative process in which agents react to last period’s outcome. An equilibrium is stable
if it is the limiting outcome of such a process.16 A simple method to determine whether an
equilibrium is stable is to analyze the agents’ optimal response to small deviations in the
equilibrium outcome.
Figure 2 plots an investor’s optimal information acquisition decision as a function of the
fraction of informed agents in the economy (the parameter values correspond to case 2(a)
in Proposition 2). An equilibrium at the information acquisition stage is defined by the
condition that the fraction of informed agents equals the probability that any agent acquires
information. In our numerical example, the three points at which an investor’s optimal
response function crosses the 45◦ line are characterized by λ = 0, λ∗∗ = 0.39, and λ∗ = 0.81.
Figure 2 clearly illustrates that information can be a complementary good in our model.
Agents have no incentive to purchase the private signal Yi if λ < λ∗∗; however, as λ increases
to a level between λ∗∗ and λ∗, the value of the signal goes up and investors find it optimal
to acquire it. This observation establishes the following result.
Proposition 3. Suppose that Ĉ < 0 < τ2γ2 + Ĉ/σ2z and λ
∗ < 1. Then, the only stable
equilibria at the information acquisition stage are λ = 0 and λ = λ∗.
16For a formal definition, see, e.g., Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995), chapter 17.
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Stability rules out the equilibrium in which a fraction λ = λ∗∗ of the agents become
informed. As can be seen in Figure 2, any perturbation of this equilibrium will make agents
switch to one of the other two equilibria. We will therefore ignore the unstable equilibrium
in the ensuing analysis.
5 Asset Price Jumps
In order to discuss movements in asset prices, it is necessary to extend our model to a dynamic
setting. Following Veldkamp (2006b), we take the most parsimonious approach, and simply
consider a sequence of one-period economies, where the model primitives are allowed to vary












assume that the functions µx and σx are continuous, so that a small change in the realization
of Xt−1 only causes a small change in the distribution of Xt. To guarantee some non-trivial
dynamics, we further assume that the function σx is strictly increasing, and that its range
is the entire positive real line, i.e., σx : R → R+.18 For simplicity, we let the preference
parameters measuring risk-aversion, τ , and consumption externalities, γ, be time-invariant.
Letting λt and Pt denote the fraction of informed agents and the asset price at date t,
one can obtain an equilibrium path in this dynamic economy for both λt and Pt simply by
using the results from Propositions 1 and 2. In particular, we assume that the realization
of Xt is publicly observable at date t, so that traders can predict the moments µx(Xt) and
σx(Xt). Using these parameters in Proposition 2 yields the measure of informed agents λt.
In the case of multiple equilibria, we follow the natural convention that if in the previous
period we had λt−1 = 0 and λt = 0 is an admissible equilibrium, then agents will coordinate
17In Veldkamp (2006b), the asset payoff Xt is assumed to follow an AR(1) process with mean µx and
proportional shocks η: Xt = (1− ρ)µx + ρXt−1(1 + ηt), where ηt ∼ N (0, σ2η). This specification corresponds
to the special case µx(Xt) = (1− ρ)µx + ρXt and σ2x(Xt) = ρ2σ2ηX2t in our setting.
18We want to point out that allowing for time variation in any of the other model primitives that affect the
endogenous measure of informed traders would lead to the same conclusion as the one stated in Proposition
4.
18
on that equilibrium. Similarly, if λt−1 = λ∗, then agents will again coordinate on λt = λ∗, if
possible. Proposition 1 then yields the equilibrium prices at date t. Given the dependence of
prices at date t on the time t− 1 realization of the random variable Xt−1 (via the functions
µx and σx), as well as on the realizations of Xt and Zt, we write P (Xt, Zt;Xt−1).
There are several definitions of price jumps, crashes, and bubbles in the literature.19 In
the above economy, prices will change in each period because of shocks to the fundamentals
Xt and to the aggregate supply Zt. However, since the payoff variance σ2x is a continuous
function of Xt−1, small changes in fundamentals will lead to small changes in prices when
there are no consumption externalities. The following definition of price jumps therefore
seems natural in our setting:
lim
|ε|↓0
Pt(Xt, Zt;Xt−1 + ε)− Pt(Xt, Zt;Xt−1) > 0. (14)
An economy exhibits price jumps when small changes in fundamentals at date t − 1 can
produce large changes in prices at date t.20 The following result is a consequence of the
multiplicity of equilibria in Proposition 2.
Proposition 4. The prices in the dynamic model exhibit jumps (in the sense defined in (14)),
if and only if γ > 0.
In order to obtain an intuitive understanding of this result, we plot the stable equilibria
from Proposition 2 as a function of the payoff variance σ2x in Figure 3. Over the range
σ2x ∈ (0.87, 1.01), we have two stable equilibria: one where no agent becomes informed, and
one with a positive fraction of informed agents. No matter what equilibrium one starts at, it
is clear that changes in the payoff variance will induce discrete price jumps, as the measure
of informed agents differs across these two equilibria. For example, suppose that we start
with an equilibrium such that λ > 0 (i.e., σ2x is sufficiently large). Then, as σ
2
x falls below
19For an excellent survey of this literature, see Brunnermeier (2001).
20Our definition of jumps is similar in spirit to a continuous time definition where the sample paths of prices
exhibit discontinuities.
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0.87, the fraction of informed agents jumps from λ = 0.42 to λ = 0. An inspection of the
price coefficients in Proposition 1 shows that this change in λ causes a discontinuity in prices
in the sense defined in (14). The model also predicts jumps in the other direction. If the
economy is in an equilibrium where λ = 0, then, as σ2x increases above 1.01, the fraction of
informed agents jumps from λ = 0 to λ = 0.80.
The assumption that σx is increasing in Xt implies that the value of information is pos-
itively related to the expected payoff. Thus, when the state of the economy improves, we
expect to see a jump up in prices, as the agents move from the no-information to the high-
information equilibrium. Similarly, when the fundamentals go down, asset prices experience
a discrete jump down (i.e., a “crash”) as agents stop acquiring information. An important
implication of our model is that crashes are accompanied by an increase in the conditional
asset variance and, hence, by an increase in the equity premium.
6 Herding and Informational Inefficiencies
In this section, we show that complementarities in the information market can lead to an
inefficient allocation of the agents’ research effort. In particular, we demonstrate that when
relative wealth concerns are sufficiently strong, agents prefer to acquire perfectly correlated
signals, even though their incremental value in predicting future asset payoffs is low. To this
end, we extend our basic model by giving agents a choice between acquiring a conditionally
independent signal Yi = X + εi and a perfectly correlated signal Y = X + δ. The collection
of error terms {εi} and δ are assumed to be independently normally distributed with zero
means and variances σ2ε and σ
2
δ , respectively. At the information acquisition stage, agents
can acquire the signal Yi at a cost of cε, and the signal Y at a cost of cδ. To distinguish
the two types of informed agents, we refer to agents who choose the former (latter) signal as
ε-informed (δ-informed). All other aspects of the model are the same as in Section 3.
As in the previous sections, we restrict our attention to linear equilibria and conjecture
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that the equilibrium price function is of the following form:
P = a+ bxX + byY − dZ. (15)
We further postulate that the optimal trading strategy of ε-informed (δ-informed) agents is
a linear function of the signal Yi (Y ) and the equilibrium price P . Letting βε (βδ) denote
the coefficient of the signal Yi (Y ) in the linear demand function of ε-informed (δ-informed)




θidi = ξ + λεβεX + λδβδY − κP, (16)
where λε (λδ) denotes the fraction of ε-informed (δ-informed) agents, and ξ and κ are con-
stants.
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium at the trading stage for a given
number of ε-informed and δ-informed agents.
Proposition 5. There exists a γ̄ > 0 such that for any γ < γ̄, an equilibrium at the trading
stage exists. The optimal investment by agent i in the risky asset is given by:
θi =











E [X − P |Fi]
)
(17)
where Fi denotes the information possessed by agent i.
Equilibrium prices are as in (15); the relevant price coefficients are given in the Appendix.
In contrast to the case analyzed in Section 4, the agents’ optimal trading strategy contains
an additional term that is proportional to λδ. As agents try to mimic the average demand θ̄
because of their relative wealth concerns, they now have to forecast the signal Y , since the
error term δ has a non-negligible effect on θ̄ if λδ > 0. δ-informed agents directly observe Y
and thus demand an additional γλδβδY shares to make sure that their wealth is close to the
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average level. ε-informed agents, on the other hand, have to forecast Y based on their own
signal Yi and the equilibrium price P .
The proof of Proposition 5 reveals that the equilibrium trading intensities βε and βδ of














The trading intensity of ε-informed agents is not affected by the presence of δ-informed
investors and does not depend on the KUJ parameter γ. It is identical to the expression
derived in Section 4. The trading intensity of δ-informed agents, however, is influenced by
their relative wealth considerations: as γ increases, they care more about each other’s wealth
and, hence, trade more aggressively on their common signal Y . It is also worth noting that βδ
is decreasing in the fraction of ε-informed agents. This is due to the fact that prices become
more informative as λε increases, making the signal Y less valuable to agents.
The above discussion has assumed that both types of informed agents coexist in the
market. In order to demonstrate that this can indeed be the case, we have to calculate
the expected utility of ε-informed, δ-informed, and uninformed agents at the information
acquisition stage. The proof of Proposition 6 shows that agent i’s certainty equivalent of
















where H is independent of the agent’s information set Fi.
Comparing the above expression to equation (12) in Section 4, we find that in this gener-
alized framework, there are two additional terms that are negatively related to λδ. The first
term, which is proportional to the linear regression coefficient of the signal Y on the asset
payoff X (conditional on the equilibrium price P ), captures the intuition that a more precise
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signal Y improves the trading profit of δ-informed agents, and thus hurts other investors if
they care about their relative wealth. The second term is related to the fact that, because
of the common error term in their signals, δ-informed agents increase the variance of the
average wealth level. This imposes a negative externality on agents who do not observe this
error term.
The definition of an equilibrium at the information acquisition stage in this extended
model is analogous to the one given in Section 3.2. In order to calculate the equilibrium
number of ε-informed, δ-informed, and uninformed agents, we have to compare the ex-ante
expected utility of the different investor types to each other. We will say that an equilibrium
exhibits “weak herding” if λδ > 0. We will use the term “strong herding” to refer to equilibria
for which λδ > 0 and λε = 0. These equilibria are characterized by the fact that agents herd on
the same information, even though private signals with orthogonal error terms are available to
them. Of course, the existence of such herding equilibria depends on the signal-to-noise ratio
of the two signals captured by the parameters σε and σδ, as well as on the cost parameters cε
and cδ. The following proposition presents results for the case in which both types of signals
have the same precision and are equally costly.
Proposition 6. Suppose that the two signals Yi = X + εi and Y = X + δ have the same
precision (i.e., σε = σδ) and are equally costly to investors (i.e., cε = cδ). Then, in the
absence of relative wealth concerns (i.e., when γ = 0), there are no weak herding equilibria.
If, on the other hand, the agents’ relative wealth concerns are sufficiently strong, there exist
equilibria that exhibit strong herding.
The first result in Proposition 6 establishes the non-existence of herding equilibria in
standard REE models without consumption externalities. In such models, the returns to
acquiring information fall as the number of identically informed agents increases. These
negative informational externalities encourage investors to acquire signals that are orthogonal
to the information revealed by prices. Thus, when given a choice between the two equally
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informative (and equally costly) signals Y and Yi, agents always prefer the conditionally
independent signal Yi when relative wealth considerations are not important to them.
The second result shows that strong herding equilibria, in which all informed agents
acquire the same signal, can exist when agents care about their peer’s consumption.21 In
fact, if γ is sufficiently large, relative wealth concerns dominate the information effect, and
investors are better off gathering perfectly correlated information. This can be seen from
equation (19). While the incremental value of the signal Yi exceeds that of the signal Y (i.e.,
var(X|Yi, P ) ≤ var(X|Y, P ) under our assumption that σε = σδ), knowing Y allows agents to
eliminate the uncertainty about the average wealth level caused by the common error term δ.
By knowing what others know, agents can make sure not to fall behind their peers. In that
sense, the signal’s value to agents goes beyond its usefulness in predicting future asset payoffs.
In fact, equation (19) reveals that agents with KUJ preferences may herd on information that
is completely unrelated to fundamentals.
Strong herding equilibria are clearly inefficient. Rather than acquiring signals that com-
plement the information revealed by prices, agents exert costly effort to duplicate the infor-
mation that is available to their peers. This inefficient allocation of research effort reduces
the informational content of asset prices, which can affect social welfare through two distinct
channels. First, it leads to less informed portfolio decisions and, hence, lowers the agents’ ex-
pected utility from trading. Second, in a broader framework in which firms use asset prices to
guide their production decisions, this informational inefficiency may also lead to a suboptimal
allocation of investment resources.
21We want to point out, however, that strong herding equilibria are typically not unique. There are other
equilibria in which agents prefer to acquire conditionally independent signals or to stay uninformed. This is
not surprising, given our results in Section 4.
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7 Community Effects and Local Interactions
Our analysis so far has been conducted under the assumption that relative wealth concerns
are global, in the sense that agents care about their relative position with respect to the
entire economy. More realistic social interactions suggest a more local take on relative wealth
considerations. The most natural interpretation is that of communities, where each agent
has relative wealth concerns only with respect to other agents in her community.22 We
incorporate this idea into our model by generalizing our KUJ preference specification in the
following way:
u(Wi, W̄k) = − exp(−τ(Wi − γW̄k)), (20)
where W̄k denotes the average wealth of agents that belong to the same community k as
agent i. To keep the notational burden to a minimum, we assume that there are only two
communities, a and b. Each community consists of a continuum of agents with measure 1/2.
As before, we conjecture that the average demand function in community k ∈ {a, b} is linear
in the asset payoff X and the equilibrium price P : θ̄k = ξk +λkβkX−κkP . All other aspects
of the model are the same as in Section 3.
The equilibrium at the trading stage is similar to the one characterized in Proposition 1.
The only difference is that, rather than trying to mimic the average trade in the economy,
investors now only care about trades executed by agents in their own community. Thus,
while the total number of informed agents across both communities, λa + λb, influences an
investor’s demand function through its effect on the conditional payoff variance var(X|Fi),
the demand effect due to our KUJ preference specification only depends on the number of
22Going back to our motivation based on relative performance contracts in Section 3.1, we can interpret
different communities as different classes of mutual funds, each compensated relative to its own benchmark,
so that relative wealth considerations arise with respect to other fund managers that invest in the same asset
class.
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informed agents in community k, λk:
θi =




ξk − P (κk − λkβk)
)
. (21)
In order to derive the equilibrium number of informed agents in communities a and b, one
has to compare the ex-ante expected utility of informed and uninformed investors in each
community. Simple calculations (analogous to the ones in the proof of Proposition 2) show












where H is independent of the agent’s information set Fi. It is important to note that Ui
is a function of the information acquired in both communities, since the informativeness of
the equilibrium price P , which is contained in the information set Fi, depends on the total
number of informed agents in the economy.23 The following proposition characterizes all
stable equilibria at the information acquisition stage for the two-community case.
Proposition 7. Let Ĉ = 1/(σ2ε (e
2τc − 1))− 1/σ2x and assume that γ < 1/(τσxσz).
1. If Ĉ > 0, then there exist three stable equilibria at the information acquisition stage:
one symmetric equilibrium with the same fraction λk = min(λ∗, 1) of informed agents
in both communities, where λ∗ is given by equation (10), and two asymmetric equilibria
in which a fraction λk = min(λ∗c , 1) of agents become informed in one community and












23One can easily verify that the conditional payoff variance is given by:











2. If Ĉ ≤ 0, then two cases are relevant:
(a) If 4τ2γ2 + Ĉ/σ2z ≥ 0, then there are three stable equilibria at the information ac-
quisition stage: two asymmetric equilibria with a positive fraction λk = min(λ∗c , 1)
of informed agents in one community and no informed agents in the other com-
munity, and one symmetric equilibrium that involves no information acquisition,
i.e., λa = λb = 0.
(b) If 4τ2γ2 + Ĉ/σ2z < 0, the unique equilibrium is for all agents to stay uninformed,
i.e., λa = λb = 0.
Similar to the single-community case, there are three different types of equilibria, depend-
ing on the value of Ĉ. Figure 4 illustrates these equilibria for a representative set of parameter
values. When information is cheap (c < 0.347 in Figure 4), then Ĉ > 0 and we have three
stable equilibria: one is symmetric with the same number of informed agents in both commu-
nities (solid line); the other two are asymmetric with a positive number of informed agents in
one community (dashed line) and no informed agents in the other community (dotted line).
Not surprisingly, when the cost of gathering information is sufficiently high (c > 0.357), it is
optimal for all agents to stay uninformed. Thus, the unique equilibrium is characterized by
λa = λb = 0 in this case.
For intermediate values of the information acquisition cost (i.e., when 0.347 ≤ c ≤ 0.357,
so that Ĉ ≤ 0 ≤ 4τ2γ2 + Ĉ/σ2z), there are multiple symmetric and asymmetric equilib-
ria. Interestingly, all symmetric equilibria in which a positive fraction of agents from both
communities acquire information are unstable.24 This can be seen from Figure 5, which
plots the optimal response of agents in community b as a function of the fraction of in-
formed agents in this community, setting the fraction of informed agents in community a
to its equilibrium value. In our numerical example, the two symmetric equilibria are given
24One can show that for Ĉ < 0 < 4τ2γ2 + Ĉ/σ2z , there are always two unstable symmetric equilibria
corresponding to the fractions λ∗ and λ∗∗ of informed agents specified in Proposition 2.
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by λa = λb = λ∗ = 0.274 (left panel) and λa = λb = λ∗∗ = 0.126 (right panel). Figure 5
shows that neither of them is a stable equilibrium, since the agents’ optimal response function
crosses the 45◦ line from below at these points, implying that a small increase (decrease) in
the number of informed traders makes it optimal for the agent (not) to acquire information
herself.
To obtain an intuitive understanding for why the equilibrium with λk = λ∗ is stable in
the single-community case, but fails to be stable when we divide the population of agents
into two communities (and Ĉ < 0), consider the effect that a small increase in λk has on an
agent’s expected utility in these two cases. The reduction in the agent’s certainty equivalent
of wealth caused by the increase in the average wealth in her community is the same in both
cases (see equations (12) and (22)). However, the positive effect due to the improved price
informativeness (i.e., the increase in the precision var(X|P )−1) is smaller in the case with
two communities, since an increase in λk by ∆ increases the total fraction of informed agents
in the economy only by ∆/2. This can also be seen from equations (8) and (23). Thus,
compared to the single-community case, relative wealth concerns play a more prominent role
when there are two communities, making information a complementary good whenever λk
exceeds λ∗. The opposite holds when λk falls below λ∗.
The above discussion indicates that introducing relative wealth concerns at the commu-
nity level dramatically changes how agents optimally allocate their research effort. While
symmetric equilibria in which different communities of agents follow the same information
acquisition strategy may exist, it is quite natural to expect agents in different communities
to specialize in different assets. This is consistent with the empirical findings of the growing
literature on community effects and social interactions. For example, Hong, Kubik, and Stein
(2004a) show that investment decisions are related to social interaction, which is naturally
linked to communities. A number of studies, including Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Feng
and Seasholes (2004), and Ivković and Weisbenner (2005a), also document that investors are
more likely to invest in firms that are geographically close to them. Our model of relative
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wealth concerns can generate these patterns, and, for some parameterizations, predicts them
as the only stable outcome.
8 Conclusion
This paper extends the standard REE model with endogenous information acquisition devel-
oped by Hellwig (1980) and Verrecchia (1982) to account for relative wealth considerations.
In particular, we examine how consumption externalities resulting from a KUJ preference
specification affect investors’ incentives to acquire information. Our analysis shows that such
consumption externalities can generate complementarities in information acquisition. In the
absence of relative wealth concerns, an agent’s benefit from acquiring information is decreas-
ing in the number of informed investors. The reason is that as more agents become informed,
more information is revealed through asset prices and uninformed agents can free-ride on
the learning of others. If agents are sensitive to the wealth of others, this effect is counter-
acted by the agents’ concern about their relative position in the economy. A larger number
of informed investors increases the average wealth, which imposes a negative externality on
uninformed agents. We demonstrate that if the number of informed investors is not too high,
relative wealth concerns dominate the information revelation effect, and the marginal value
of information increases in the number of informed agents.
These complementarities in information acquisition can generate multiple herding equi-
libria. An agent’s optimal decision as to whether she should gather information depends on
her beliefs about the behavior of other agents. If she believes that most of her peers acquire
information, she has an incentive to acquire information as well in order to keep up with them.
On the other hand, if she expects others not to be informed, she may not find it worthwhile
to spend resources on collecting information. In equilibrium, these beliefs are self-fulfilling.
Some of these herding equilibria involve an inefficient allocation of the agents’ research ef-
fort. In particular, we show that when relative wealth concerns are sufficiently strong, agents
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ignore signals about fundamentals in favor of signals that are informative about their peers’
trades.
We also consider the implications of relative wealth concerns for asset returns. We find
that these consumption externalities lead to an increase in informed trading, which reduces
the risk that investors have to bear and thus lowers the risk premium. Thus, by endogenizing
the agents’ information acquisition decision, we identify a new channel through which KUJ
preferences affect the equity premium. In addition to the direct channel discussed in previous
studies (Abel, 1990; Gaĺı, 1994), there is an indirect channel that operates through an increase
in the value of information to investors.
Further, we demonstrate that the multiplicity of equilibria at the information acquisition
stage can cause price discontinuities. Extending our model to a dynamic setting in which
the distribution of asset payoffs is linked to past realizations, we show that small changes
in fundamentals can lead to large changes in asset prices. These price jumps are caused
by changes in the risk premium as agents switch from an equilibrium with many informed
traders to an equilibrium with few informed traders (and vice versa).
Finally, we discuss how relative wealth concerns can help explain recent empirical findings
regarding the home bias or other local biases in portfolio choice. By introducing relative
wealth concerns at the community level, we show that in many cases, only equilibria in
which different communities follow different information acquisition strategies exist. Thus,
consistent with the empirical evidence, our results indicate that it is quite natural for agents
in different communities to specialize on different assets.
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Appendix
The following lemma is a standard result on multivariate normal random variables (see, e.g.,
Marin and Rahi (1999)) and is used to calculate the agents’ expected utility:
Lemma 1. Let X ∈ Rn be a normally distributed random vector with mean (vector) µ and













(b+ 2Aµ)>(I − 2ΣA)−1Σ(b+ 2Aµ)
)
, (25)
where A ∈ Rn×n is a symmetric matrix and b ∈ Rn is a vector.
Note that (25) is only well-defined if the matrix I − 2ΣA is positive definite.
Proof of Proposition 1
Let Vi denote agent i’s “relative payoff” Vi = Wi − γW̄ . Simple calculations show that:
Vi = (θi + γ(P (κ− λβ)− ξ))(X − P )− γλβ(X − P )2. (26)
The agent’s expected utility is therefore given by the exponential of a quadratic function of
















Ψi = 1− 2τγλβΣi, (28)
Υi = γ
(
P (κ− λβ)− ξ − λβηi
)
ηi, (29)
Γi(θi) = θi + γ
(
P (κ− λβ)− ξ − 2λβηi
)
, (30)
with ηi = E [X − P |Fi] and Σi = var(X − P |Fi).
Since Ψi and Υi are independent of θi, maximizing (27) with respect to θi is equivalent to
maximizing θiηi− τΓi(θi)2Σi/(2Ψi). Simple algebra shows that the optimal trading strategy
is given by (7). The second-order condition reduces to Ψi > 0.
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Furthermore, one can verify that:
























E [X|Yi, P ] = µx +
var(X|Yi, P )
σ2ε
(Yi − µx) +
b var(X|Yi, P )
d2σ2z
(P − E [P ]), (33)
E [X|P ] = µx +
b var(X|P )
d2σ2z
(P − E [P ]). (34)
Substituting these conditional moments into the agent’s demand function given by (7) yields
the following expressions for the coefficients α, β, δ, ζ, and ν:
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The market clearing condition can therefore be written as:∫ 1
0
θidi = α+ λβX − κP = Z. (39)
This implies that the equilibrium price coefficients a, b, and d are characterized by the fol-
lowing three equations: κa = α, κb = λβ, and κd = 1. From these equations, it immediately
follows that b/d = λ/(τσ2ε ), which pins down the variances var(X|P ) and var(X|Yi, P ).
From the definition of κ and the above expressions for δ and ν, we have:
κ = λδ + (1− λ)ν (40)
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This expression together with the equilibrium condition κd = 1 can be used to solve for the
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price coefficient d. Further, the expression for a can be derived from the condition κa = α.
One can readily verify that the price coefficients can be expressed in terms of the model’s
primitives as follows:
d =






































Finally, we note that if the second-order condition Ψi = 1− 2τγλβΣi > 0 is satisfied for
an uninformed agent, then it is also satisfied for an informed agent. Therefore, a necessary
and sufficient condition for a linear equilibrium with λ > 0 to exist is that Ψi > 0 holds for








− 2λγ > 0. (45)
It is easy to check that γ < 1/(τσxσz) is a sufficient condition for the above inequality to
hold for all λ ∈ [0, 1]. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2
Substituting the agent’s optimal demand θi given by equation (7) into the expression for the
interim expected utility given by equation (27), we have:








where, as before, ηi = E [X − P |Fi] and Σi = var(X − P |Fi). The ex-ante expected utility
(before P and Yi are observed) is therefore given by the expectation of an exponential function
of η2i . Since ηi is a normal random variable, it follows from Lemma 1 that:
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where we have used the fact that for normally distributed random variables, the variance
satisfies var(X) = var(E [X|Fi]) + var(X|Fi).
The certainty equivalent of wealth for informed agents, gross of information acquisition















log (var(X − P )) + (µx − E [P ])
2























Further, recall from the proof of Proposition 1 that:
























Now consider the case where Ĉ ≡ 1/(σ2ε (e2τc − 1)) − 1/σ2x > 0. An interior equilibrium is
defined by λ ∈ (0, 1) such that VI(λ)− c = VU (λ). Using the expressions derived above, one








− Ĉ = 0. (54)
The discriminant of this quadratic equation is always positive when Ĉ > 0. Furthermore,
if Ĉ > 0, it has only one positive root.25 Thus, the unique interior equilibrium is given by
λ = λ∗ as defined by equation (10). We are left to check whether there exist any corner
equilibria. Clearly, λ = 0 cannot be an equilibrium when Ĉ > 0. However, λ∗ can exceed 1.
In this case, the unique equilibrium is λ = 1.
Next, consider the case where Ĉ ≤ 0. In this case, the quadratic equation in (54) has real
roots if and only if τ2γ2 + Ĉ/σ2z ≥ 0. If this condition is not met, the unique equilibrium is
therefore for all agents to stay uninformed (i.e, λ = 0). On the other hand, if this inequality
25This follows immediately from Descartes’ rule of sign.
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holds, then there are two positive solutions. The corresponding equilibria are given by λ =
min(λ∗, 1) and λ = min(λ∗∗, 1), where λ∗ and λ∗∗ are defined in Proposition 2. Note, however,
that since Ĉ ≤ 0, we have VI(0)− c ≤ VU (0). Thus, λ = 0 is an equilibrium as well.
Proof of Proposition 3
Let R(λ) = VI(λ)−VU (λ) denote the difference between the certainty equivalent of informed
and uninformed agents. Then, a necessary (sufficient) condition for an interior equilibrium
characterized by R(λ̂) = c to be stable is that dR(λ̂)/dλ ≤ 0 (dR(λ̂)/dλ < 0). Substituting
the expressions for VI(λ) and VU (λ) derived in the proof of Proposition 2 into the function





























If Ĉ < 0 < τ2γ2 + Ĉ/σ2z and λ
∗ < 1, the two interior equilibria are given by λ = λ∗
and λ = λ∗∗. From the expressions in equations (10) and (11), it follows immediately that
λ∗ > γτ2σ2εσ
2
z and that λ
∗∗ < γτ2σ2εσ
2
z . This proves that only the equilibrium given by
λ = λ∗ is stable. Clearly, the corner solution λ = 0 is a stable equilibrium as well.
Proof of Proposition 4
We first argue that if γ = 0, condition (14) cannot hold. In this case, the only interior
equilibrium at the information acquisition stage is characterized by λt = λ∗(σx(Xt)), where
λ∗ is defined in Proposition 2. Note that λ∗ is a continuous function of Xt, since σx is
continuous in Xt and λ∗ is continuous in σx. Further, since λt = 0 (λt = 1) if λ∗(σx(Xt)) ≤ 0
(λ∗(σx(Xt)) ≥ 1), it follows immediately that λt is a continuous function of Xt. Thus, price
jumps as defined in (14) cannot occur if γ = 0.
Next, consider the case where γ > 0. Let X∗ denote the value of Xt such that Ĉ(σx(Xt)) =
0, where Ĉ is defined in Proposition 2. Further, let X∗∗ denote the value of Xt such that
τ2γ2 + Ĉ(σx(Xt))/σ2z = 0. We claim that if λt−1 = 0, then Xt = X
∗ satisfies condition
(14). The argument goes as follows. At Xt = X∗, we have Ĉ = 0, which implies that
λt = 0 is an equilibrium (Proposition 2). Thus, by our convention, the equilibrium fraction
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of informed agents is equal to λt = 0 when Xt = X∗ and λt−1 = 0. However, for any ε > 0,
Ĉ(σx(X∗+ε)) > 0 and thus the unique equilibrium is given by λt = min(λ∗(σx(X∗+ε)), 1) >
0. This follows again from Proposition 2. An infinitesimal change in Xt therefore causes a
discrete change in λt, which in turn causes a discrete jump in prices as defined by condition
(14).26
Similarly, if λt−1 > 0, then Xt = X∗∗ satisfies condition (14). In this case, the equilibrium
at the information acquisition stage is characterized by λt > 0, since Ĉ < 0 = τ2γ2 + Ĉ/σ2z
at Xt = X∗∗ and λt−1 > 0. However, for any ε > 0, we have τ2γ2 + Ĉ(σx(X∗∗ − ε))/σ2z < 0,
which implies that the unique equilibrium is given by λt = 0 (Proposition 2). Thus, a small
change in fundamentals leads again to a large change in prices.
Proof of Proposition 5
The calculations involved in this proof are analogous to those in the proof of Proposition 1.
The relevant payoff variable of agent i, Vi = Wi − γW̄ , is given by:
Vi = (θi + γ(P (κ− λεβε)− ξ)) (X − P )− γλδβδY (X − P )− γλεβε(X − P )2, (57)
which is a quadratic function of the normal random vector (X − P, Y ). Using Lemma 1, we
















Ψi = 1− 2τγ (λεβεΣi,11 + λδβδΣi,12)− τ2γ2λ2δβ2δ |Σi|, (59)
Λi = −γλδβδηi,1, (60)
Υi = γ
(
P (κ− λεβε)− ξ − λεβεηi,1 − λδβδηi,2
)
ηi,1, (61)
Γi(θi) = θi + γ
(
P (κ− λεβε)− ξ − 2λεβεηi,1 − λδβδηi,2
)
, (62)
Qi(θi) = Γi(θi)2Σi,11 + 2Γi(θi)Λi(Σi,12 + τγλδβδ|Σi|) + Λ2i (Σi,22 − 2τγλεβε|Σi|), (63)
with ηi = E [(X − P, Y )|Fi] and Σi = var((X − P, Y )|Fi). ηi,m (Σi,mn) denotes the mth
(mnth) element of the vector ηi (matrix Σi).
The agent’s optimal trading strategy in (17) follows immediately from the first-order
26It can easily be verified that the equilibrium price Pt is strictly increasing in λt as long as γ < 1 and
µz > 0. This can also be seen from the risk premium given by equation (9).
36
condition. The second-order condition is given by Ψi > 0.27 Equation (59) shows that this
inequality holds for sufficiently small values of γ. The conditional moments ηi and Σi can
be calculated from the projection theorem. Substituting these conditional moments into the
agent’s demand function and imposing the market clearing condition θ̄ = Z, we obtain the











Finally, rearranging the market clearing condition, we find that the equilibrium price coeffi-
cients satisfy the restrictions bx/d = λεβε and bY /d = λδβδ.28
Proof of Proposition 6
Analogous calculations to those in the proof of Proposition 2 show that the agents’ ex-ante
expected utility is given by:
E [u(Vi)] = −
∣∣∣∣Ψi var(X − P )var(X|Fi)
∣∣∣∣−1/2 exp(− (µx − E [P ])22 var(X − P )
)
, (66)
where Ψi is defined in equation (59). The certainty equivalent of wealth, gross of information
















where we have used the fact that:




As before, the H term is independent of agent i’s information set Fi.
For a weak herding equilibrium to exist, investors must be indifferent between acquiring
27It can easily be verified that this condition is also sufficient for the agent’s conditional expected utility in
(58) to be well-defined.
28Note that the normalized price P̃ = P/d is informationally equivalent to P . Thus, in order to characterize
the equilibrium at the information acquisition stage, we only need to know the ratios bx/d and bY /d.
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the signal Y and the signal Yi. Thus, under the assumption that cε = cδ, we must have:
var(X|Y, P )−1 = var(X|Yi, P )−1−2τγλδβδ
cov(X,Y |Yi, P )
var(X|Yi, P )
−τ2γ2λ2δβ2δ var(Y |X,Yi, P ). (69)













where we have used the projection theorem to calculate the conditional moments:



















Substituting the equilibrium trading intensities βε and βδ given by equation (18) into equation
(70) and setting σε = σδ = σs yields:
λ2δλ
2
ε + λδ(λδ + 2λε)τ
2σ2sσ
2
z = 0. (73)
Clearly, the above equation only holds for λδ = 0. This proves that, in the absence of relative
wealth concerns, there are no herding equilibria.
In order to prove the existence of strong herding equilibria, we have to show (i) that
investors are indifferent between acquiring the signal Y and staying uninformed, and (ii) that
investors strictly prefer to acquire the signal Y rather than the signal Yi (i.e., βε = 0):
var(X|Y, P )−1e−2τc = var(X|P )−1 − 2τγλδβδ
cov(X,Y |P )
var(X|P )
− τ2γ2λ2δβ2δ var(Y |X,P ), (74)
var(X|Y, P )−1 > var(X|Yi, P )−1−2τγλδβδ
cov(X,Y |Yi, P )
var(X|Yi, P )
−τ2γ2λ2δβ2δ var(Y |X,Yi, P ), (75)















for both ε-informed and uninformed investors. Substituting these expressions and the condi-
tional moments derived above into (75), and setting σε = σδ = σs, yields:
λδβδ − 2τγσ2z − τ2γ2λδβδσ2zσ2δ < 0. (78)
Since βδ is decreasing in γ, this inequality holds for sufficiently large values of γ. The
equilibrium fraction of δ-informed investors can then be derived from equation (74), which is
a quadratic equation in λδ, since:















It can easily be verified that equation (74) has a positive root, if the information acquisition
cost c is not too large. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 7
Analogous calculations to those in the proof of Proposition 1 show that the optimal trading
strategy of agent i in community k is given by:
θi =




ξk − P (κk − λkβk)
)
, (81)
where βk = 1/(τσ2ε ). From the market clearing condition, it thus follows that equilibrium
prices are as in (4) with b/d = (λa + λb)/(2τσ2ε ).
The derivation of the equilibrium at the information acquisition stage follows the steps
of the proof of Proposition 2. Substituting the agent’s optimal trading strategy into the
expression for the interim expected utility and applying Lemma 1, we can write the certainty











where H is independent of the agent’s information set Fi. Comparing this expression to the
certainty equivalent in the single-community case given by equation (12) immediately reveals
that λa = λb = min(λ∗, 1) is an equilibrium when there are two communities. In addition
to this symmetric equilibrium, there are also asymmetric equilibria in which only agents in
one of the two communities gather information. If λb = 0, it can be shown that λa = λ∗c , as
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defined in the proposition, makes agents in community a indifferent between acquiring and
not acquiring information (assuming that λ∗c ∈ (0, 1)), whereas agents in community b have
no incentive to acquire information. Of course, λa = 0 and λb = λ∗c is also an equilibrium.
When Ĉ > 0, these are the only equilibria, since the other root of the quadratic equation—
given by λ∗∗ for the symmetric equilibrium, and by λ∗∗c (defined below) for the asymmetric
equilibrium—is negative. It can easily be verified that all three equilibria are stable in this
case.
When Ĉ ≤ 0 ≤ 4τ2γ2 + Ĉ/σ2z , four additional equilibria exist: two symmetric equilibria
with λa = λb = 0 and λa = λb = λ∗∗, where λ∗∗ is defined in Proposition 2; and two
asymmetric equilibria characterized by λa = 0 and λb = λ∗∗c , and by λa = λ
∗∗
c and λb =










. It is straightforward to show that all
equilibria involving λ∗∗ or λ∗∗c are unstable for the reasons discussed in Section 4. The
asymmetric equilibria involving λ∗c , on the other hand, are easily verified to be stable.
Finally, when 4τ2γ2+Ĉ/σ2z < 0, it follows from (10) and (24) that the quadratic equations
characterizing λ∗ and λ∗c have no real roots. Thus, the unique equilibrium is given by λa =
λb = 0.
Interestingly, the symmetric equilibrium λa = λb = λ∗ turns out to be unstable as well,
if Ĉ < 0. To see this, let R(λa, λb) denote the difference between the certainty equivalent of
informed and uninformed agents in community a, i.e.:





















A necessary condition for the symmetric equilibrium to be stable is that ∂R(λ∗, λ∗)/∂λa ≤ 0.
Tedious but straightforward calculations show that this inequality holds if and only if λ∗ ≥
2τ2γσ2εσ
2
z . It is obvious from the definition of λ
∗ in Proposition 2 that this can only be the
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Figure 1: The graph presents the equilibrium fraction of informed agents, λ, as a function
of the cost of gathering information, c. The solid line corresponds to the standard model
with γ = 0. The dotted and dashed lines correspond to equilibria with γ = 0.2, 0.4, and 0.6,




z = τ = 1.
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Figure 2: The graph presents the optimal information acquisition decision of an agent as
a function of the fraction of informed agents. Parameters correspond to those satisfying






z = τ = 1, c = 0.45, and γ = 0.6.
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Figure 3: The graph presents the equilibrium fraction of informed agents, λ, at the two stable
equilibria as a function of the payoff variance, σ2x. The dotted lines correspond to the points
where the equilibrium switches from uniqueness to multiplicity. The parameter values used
in the graph are σ2ε = σ
2
z = τ = 1, c = 0.3, and γ = 0.2.
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Figure 4: The graph presents the equilibrium fraction of informed agents in community k, λk,
k = a, b, as a function of the cost of gathering information, c. The solid line corresponds to
the stable symmetric equilibrium where λa = λb. The dashed and the dotted line characterize
the stable asymmetric equilibria. The dashed line indicates the fraction of informed agents
in one community when all agents in the other community are uninformed (dotted line). The




z = τ = 1 and γ = 0.1.
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Figure 5: The graph presents the optimal information acquisition decision of an agent in
community b as a function of the fraction of informed agents in community b. The fraction
of informed agents in community a is set to its equilibrium value: λa = 0.274 in the left
panel, and λa = 0.126 in the right panel. The parameter values used are σ2x = σ
2
z = τ = 1,
σ2ε = 1/2, c = 0.6, and γ = 0.4.
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